Mind phenomena as "higher level features of the brain"; Is awareness sufficient for self-awareness?

http://myweb.lsbu.ac.uk/~teamcxx/hkbs/probcons.pdf

he says it is separate from attention, self-consciousness and knowledge.

can it really be separate from self-consciousness tho? i cant imagine being conscious without being self conscious.  maybe something like "ow there is pain" but not thinking that u are in pain.  maybe like sometimes when im really tired and agitated, im more aware of the agitation than my relation to it.

but i think that is really what i was thinking, this "subjective experience" or subjective aspect of feeling that cooccurs with the sensing of something.  still , it is hard to disassociate it from a sense of self.  its like the self is the observer , and enables the sensations to be possible.

if self-awareness is required for subjective experience, then by that argument animals which dont have self-awareness wouldnt feel pain.  do insects feel pain? every creature seems to avoid it.  but some creatures cry out in pain like we do.

or maybe self-awareness is more prevalent amongst animals than we think - however some animals cannot recognise themselves in a mirror.  do these animals cry out in pain?  assuming crying out in pain means u have subjective experience.

From the way searle describes it below, it sounds like a self is involved
However, though consciousness is a biological phenomenon, it has some important features that other biological phenomena do not have. The most important of these is what I have called its `subjectivity'. There is a sense in which each person's consciousness is private to that person, a sense in which he is related to his pains, tickles, itches, thoughts and feelings in a way that is quite unlike the way that others are related to those pains, tickles, itches, thoughts and feelings.

i also think it has something to do with attention or awareness - we cant feel something if we are not aware of it.

More pointedly, does the claim that there is a causal relation between brain and consciousness commit us to a dualism of `physical' things and `mental' things? The answer is a definite no. Brain processes cause consciousness but the consciousness they cause is not some extra substance or entity. It is just a higher level feature of the whole system.

These are almost exactly my thoughts - these mental things - thoughts, ideas, beliefs, statements - they can be physical things - an arrangement of physical things over time - eg. state machines.  maybe even the engendering of a subjective experience is one of these physical things.  what kind of physical things are they though? they seem to be the kind of physical entities that are processes. except they are not just to achieve something, they are something. what other kind of physical things are like a thought?

if we were programmed to think pain felt bad ... feelings are thoughts ... how is it possible for physical processes to give rise to a self that feels and thinks? its not obvious from my knowledge of computers and programming.

searle compares consciousness as a high feature of the brain to liquidity as a high feature of water ... but there is a big difference there, what is the difference exactly?